Commentary: The stalled transition in Sudan: Misunderstandings and exclusionist Politics

Source: http://addisstandard.com/commentary-the-stalled-transition-in-sudan-misunderstandings-and-exclusionist-politics/

Mukerrem Miftah (Ph.D.), For Addis Standard

Addis Abeba, June 12/2019 – April 2019 represents something significant in the modern political history of Sudan. It was in the early days of this month that decades-long popular discontents against al-Bashir’s rule suddenly moved from fragmented and less sustainable protests to more protracted and systematic nationwide protest, resulting in the ousting of al-Bashir. Although there have been some commentators who would simply-and-solely credit the protestors (and the opposition) for what had actually happened on April 11, 2019, there were important conditions that cannot just simply be downplayed.

First,
distrusts and divisions within the military complex helped pave the way for a
relatively frictionless toppling of al-Bashir. We should not underestimate the
fact that the military complex has never been enjoying internal cohesion and
unity for a long time. There have been different convictions, affiliations, or
proclivities within the military-which, even as of now, will be its point of
weakness in sustaining the crackdown on protestors and TMC’s (Transitional
Military Council) transitional rule. Although not necessarily overt enough, we
know that there are internal frictions simmering beneath the TMC’s military
complex between young officers who have been relatively sympathetic to protestors
and senior leaders who have been, in many ways, benefiting from al-Bashir’s
almost three decades old rule[1].

We
also know that there are groups, which have been very much closer to
al-Bashir’s rule, such as the Rapid Support Force (RSF) and the National
Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). However, given the preferential
treatment of these forces over and above the regular Sudanese army, there is a
growing fear that a group of soldiers may come out from this block and turn the
already stalled transition in Sudan into a never-ending bloody civil war[2].
In other words, the ousting of al-Bashir must have been facilitated by these
fertile grounds in Sudan’s military complex and security apparatus. 

Second,
days before the ousting of Al-Bashir, the Sudanese people staging a sit-in
outside army headquarters were faced with heavy gunfire and attacks. Despite
TMC’s claim, the same was recycled throughout May as well, that it was carried
out by some “infiltrators”, we know that it was actually the starting point of
RSF’s actual violent intervention under the leadership of Dagalo (Hemeti). At
this point, rather than working with the militia and closely affiliated
security forces, police forces refused to attack protestors. In fact, we know
that they had issued a communique making it clear that they will never attack
protestors[3].
This, thus, adds to the above internal division in the security and military
complex in Sudan, effectively making the protest more meaningful and successful
at ousting al-Bashir.

Beyond
these key players, what are some of the key sticking points that led to the
stalling of transition to civilian transitional rule? The following two are of
critical importance.  

Misunderstanding democracy in Underdeveloped Countries

In many
underdeveloped or developing countries in Africa, Asia, or South America, there
has always been a problem of disentangling the state or the government from the
military, party politics, and “state” ideology. In these countries, Sudan
included, the state has often been part and parcel of the military and security
complex, party politics, and ideology. 
In other words, the state has an ideology, runs party politics, and
effectively uses the security apparatus as its own recruitment ground and implements
its aspirations. In such conditions, individuals, civil societies, NGOs,
political parties, and other institutions are not treated like citizens and
members of the wider society and nation. Rather, it makes some of them as friends
and some others as enemies of the state (the ruling party, its ideology,
military, etc).  

In
countries like Sudan where the military has been the recruiting ground for
state governance for many years and decades, the problem even becomes more
complex as the marriage between the above institutions has been solidified
through successive regimes and the extension and devolution of closely
affiliated actors and institutions. This may include the media, paramilitaries,
training facilities, international relations with like-minded political actors,
and so forth. In short, this slowly evolving and snowballing condition of the
state-party-ideology-military (synchronization) effectively turned it into a
powerful stumbling block in the way of democracy. This is what happened in
Sudan. This also works to explain the challenges of democracy in other
countries like Russia and China.  

Now,
how can we relate this to the current political deadlock in Sudan? If what has
just been mentioned makes any sense, the response will be very much obvious.
For better or worse, to totally disengage the military from the body politic of
Sudan through weeks or months-long protest is beyond unrealistic. Ideally, this
should happen slowly through a long period of time, either through a deliberate
process of facilitating its [marriage]
demise or allow it to die its natural death, as the case in many countries with
a relatively mature democracy. Now, despite being part of the process of
ousting al-Bashir, even at the eleventh hour, the totally exclusionist demands
of the opposition from the outset must have been tacitly unacceptable to the
military. For this, we know that the discourse and rhetoric of the military
fundamentally shifted from its apologetic and diplomatic stance in the first
few weeks of ousting al-Bashir to a rejectionist position and harsh measures since
the beginning of June.

Understandably,
although the transfer of power to a civilian rule seems commendable and desirable,
its feasibility does not appear to have been critically well thought out. The disunity
and disorganization of the opposition claiming to represent civilians hiding
behind, in some cases, mutually exclusive ideologies and contradictions, was
sending the message that it was not really ready to take up such serious responsibility.
Considering the contradictory claims and positions of the communist,
nationalist, conservatives to “Islamists”, it was very clear to any outsider
reader of Sudan’s current political fiasco that something was eventually to
happen. For instance, at the end of May, one of the strongest oppositions, Umma
Party under the leadership of Sadek
al-Mahdi, rejected the call for a two-day general strike which was spearheaded
by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA)[4].

Apart
from internal weaknesses, the military also worked hard to make sure that a
strong unified opposition is not a reality. We know that the TMC attempted to
create discursive fissures between “pro-Sudan” and Islamist (“Islamic”) groups
and anti-Sudan, “infiltrators”, and foreign-funded political entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
on May 31, 2019, a rally was organized to support the TMC. Hundreds of
conservative Sudanese rallied in the capital Khartoum, chanting that they “support
the military” and that “freedom, peace, justice, Shari’a is the choice of the
people”[5].

On
the other end of the spectrum, the TMC, after attacking the sit-in protestors
in Khartoum, announced for a general election to be held within nine months.
Apart from nulling the recently negotiated three years transition period, it
went on to accuse the opposition of conspiring to “exclude the other political
and military forces” and   “clone
another totalitarian regime” drawn from al-Bashir’s affiliates[6].
Except perhaps for the former, the later ludicrous claim was basically what the
TMC itself was accused of in the first place. 
Understandably, it also points to the fact that there have always been
fissures within the military establishment itself as noted above.

Exclusionist Enclaves

Since
the first week of June, apart from attacking and imprisoning protestors and
opposition leaders, despite the ongoing efforts under the African Union and
Ethiopia’s government, the opposition alliance and SPA called for a nationwide
disobedience aiming to shutdown Sudan, at least in major cities, of its
transportation, social services, and others, from root-to-branch. It is not
clear, however, where this exclusivist proclivity leads. No doubt international
pressure will increase against the TMC, adding significant energy over and
above the already internal strife and division. However, the experience from
the neighboring country Egypt, highly suspected of being one of those
international actors standing behind the TMC, tells a bitter story.

Despite
massive international disparagement and negation, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi not only
unseated the democratically elected Mohammed Morsi (ironically, he is now
fighting for his life in an Egyptian prison and nobody cares!!) but also went
on to assume the role of the presidency in Egypt. Even worse, el-Sisi now leads
the very regional organization, the African Union (AU), that rejected him and suspended
his country from AU membership in 2013[7]. If
anything, exclusivist tendencies on behalf of both the TMC and opposition may
rather end being counterproductive. Both parties must realize that Sudan needs
its freedom, freely elected government, and the security if it is going to
function as another peaceful nation state. There cannot be a
one-formula-for-all solution to the multilayered and complex problems of Sudan,
be it economic, religious, peace and security, freedom and democracy, and so
forth.

Unfortunately,
it appears that AU is making the same mistake with Sudan’s TMC. It could be
argued that AU has not exhaustively and actively exploited peaceful approaches
and strategies for resolving the deadlock. Except for occasional visits to
Sudan and throwing almost inadequate and meaningless press releases, it did not
wholeheartedly engage with the problem in Sudan. Even worse, the decision to
suspend Sudan from its membership is another instance of AU’s misdiagnosis of
problematic situations and interventions. We already know that AU is known to
have failed the African people in such matter as peace and security in Africa
on multiple occasions[8].

Ethiopia’s PM Abiy Ahmed’s style peaceful round-table discussions and diplomatic channels can potentially reduce the tension and ultimately help contending parties reach a negotiated solution(s). This approach also needs to take into account “other” actors, but evidently the integral part of the problem in Sudan, to be critical actors in the negotiation. If we have enough evidence suggesting that UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are supporting the TMC (or if they are part of the problem), they will need to be brought into the peace-building processes.

Certainly,
we know that these actors are playing active roles in Sudan in many ways,
rendering strategic and financial supports to TMC[9]. In
other words, a discussion that sidelines and ignores the role of UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt will not go further and deeper. That’s actually what we are
seeing now in Sudan. Yet, very recently, the U.S. administration through its
officials, such as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David
Hale, have been discussing and putting pressure on Saudi and Emirati officials
to put more pressure on the military junta to transfer power to civilians[10].
Unfortunately, Ethiopia and AU are
only attempting to reconcile the opposition (Forces for Freedom and Change
(FFC) and TMC, but both failed to include the above three in their initiative
for a meaningful mediation.

In
spite of all the challenges and problems facing the transition in Sudan, it
appears that there are some signs that may help deescalate the ongoing friction
between the TMC and FFC. Following PM Abiy’s initial reconciliatory effort and
mediation, there is a claim from the opposition that the TMC has, though not
yet made official, accepted the opposition’s demand for leading the Sovereign
Council and take the majority out of the 15-member presidential body[11].
Similarly, there are also claims that the FFC is going to propose the former
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA), Abdalla Hamdok, to lead Sudan[12].

Nevertheless, there are many things unclear and thus no one can possibly predict what will be happening after hours, days, weeks, or months from now. Ultimately, the future of Sudan’s transition will depend on whether or not the following sticking points are acknowledged and clearly addressed. This includes whether or not the TMC accepts the proposals of Abiy Ahmed and fulfills (or at least negotiates) the conditions spelled out by FFC. On top of this, whether or not AU reverses its decision to suspend Sudan and the threat to sanction TMC; the future of the people and opposition leaders detained in various prisons in Sudan; the issue of transitional justice; and finally, the inclusion of directly or indirectly involved local, regional, and international actors, among others. AS

___________________________________________//__________________________________

Editor’s Note: Mukerrem Miftah (Ph.D.) is Assistant Professor, Institute for Eastern and Africa Studies (DOAF) Social Sciences University of Ankara ULUS/Ankara, Turkey. He can be reached at mukerem.shafi@asbu.edu.tr

__________________________________________//___________________________________

Sources:

[1] The Guardian. (6 June, 2019). African Union suspends Sudan over violence against protesters

[2] France 24. (7 June, 2019). Sudan suspension, African Union’s bold move against strongmen

[3] VOA. (9 April. 2019). Sudan Police Ordered Not to Shoot Protesters

[4] VOA News (26 May, 2019). Sudan’s leading opposition party rejects strike call

[5] France 24. (1 June, 2019). Hundreds rally in support of military council in Sudan”.

[6] Sudan Tribune. (4 June, 2019). Al-Burhan cancels agreement with Sudan’s opposition, calls for election in 9 months.

[7] World Bulletin. (26 June, 2014). AU council approves Egypt’s return from suspension

[8] African Arguments. (9 January, 2014). Why is the African Union still failing its people on peace and security?

[9] The Guardian. (5 June, 2019). “Saudi influence in spotlight as US calls on Riyadh to end Sudan violence”.

Reuters (12 April, 2019). Saudi Arabia, UAE to send $3 billion in aid to Sudan

[10] Sudan Tribune. (11 June, 2019). U.S. administration to appoint special adviser for Sudan

[11] Sudan Tribune. (11 June, 2019). Opposition FFC to lead Sudan’s Sovereign Council

[12] Sudan Tribune. (11 June, 2019). Opposition FFC to lead Sudan’s Sovereign Council

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Postscript: Ambassador Mohamoud Dirir, the Ethiopian Special Envoy to the Sudan, held discussions with the two sides.Accordingly, the two sides have agreed: to uphold what they have agreed upon before the suspension of the negotiation; to resume their talks in good faith; to refrain from inflammatory statements and de-escalate tensions; the TMC has agreed to take confidence-building measures including the release of Political Prisoners; and the FFC has agreed to call-off the Civil-Disobedience.

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